A surprising connection on LinkedIn. An offer of work from a recruiter, most likely a female agent, based in China. The chance to make around £20,000 part-time writing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a firm from China peppered with confidential or “insider” insights. Payment in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, Beijing's powerful Ministry of State Security still considers it worthwhile to use recruitment consultants to attempt this – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, MI5 chief the agency's director stated Chinese agents were contacting UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of ten thousand over the preceding two and a half years, attempting to obtain governmental, industrial, defense and scientific classified information. However a new campaign targeting politicians and parliament has led the intelligence service to take further action.
A spying warning was issued on Tuesday via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to contact MPs, peers, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anyone who might provide information.
Security Approach and Legislative Changes
In the typical style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. But the service was aware its briefing note would become public once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press helps the general population better identify interactions with a deceptive intent.
The alert has the effect of flushing out more information from in and around parliament, although that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The agency aims for people in public life to recognize that simply because interactions on professional networks are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Additionally, the domestic spy agency understood to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, although the recent actions occur after the awkward failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a legal detail earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a allegation they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and Beijing's Long-Term Interests
The law has since been updated, and the MI5 slide includes a note of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations risk significant legal consequences under the National Security Act.” It is a crime if a person participates in conduct that is or is likely to “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited access of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. Yet Beijing is also interested in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s China policy on matters such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being driven by parliamentarians.
Methodological Differences and Ongoing Cyber Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like China’s export intelligence collection techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, employing 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, commented it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
Beijing is willing to develop contacts over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to distinguish between legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for which details is considered to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may mean someone quickly marginal turning important.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless efforts at secret information gathering is in the wider context of the international competition between China and the west at a level below the level of outright war. China has stepped up its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of millions internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in persistent efforts to identify secret informants on British democracy via digital means because it wants to be provocative, to display influence and because it has the capability.
